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Abstract 
Health shocks have been shown to have important economic consequences in developed countries. Less is known 
about how health shocks impact on income, consumption, labor market outcomes, and medical expenditures in 
middle- and low-income countries. This paper explores these issues in China. In addition to providing new evidence 
on the general impact of health shocks, we also extend previous work by assessing the extent of risk protection 
afforded by formal health insurance, and by examining differences in the impact of health shocks between the rich 
and poor. We find that health shocks are associated with a substantial and significant reduction in income and labor 
supply. There are indications that the impact on income is less important for the insured, possibly because health 
insurance coverage is also associated with limited sickness insurance, but the effect is not significant. We also find 
evidence that negative health shocks are associated with an increase in unearned income for the poor but not the 
non-poor. This effect is however not strong enough to offset the impact on overall income. The loss in income is a 
consequence of a reduction in labor supply for the head of household, and we do not find evidence that other 
household members compensate by increasing their labor supply. Finally, as expected, negative health shocks are 
associated with a significant increase in out-of-pocket health care expenditures. More surprisingly, there is some 
evidence that the increase is greater for the insured than the uninsured. The findings suggest that households are 
exposed to considerable health-related shocks to disposable income, both through loss of income and health 
expenditures, and that health insurance offers very limited protection.  
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Serious illness and injury are largely unpredictable events. They can have potentially 
devastating effects on individuals and households, both through a loss of income and 
expenditures associated with medical care. Indeed, recent evidence from the US suggests that 
nearly half of personal bankruptcies are due to medical problems, with both out-of-pocket 
payments and loss of income being contributing factors (Himmelstein, Warren et al. 2005).  
There is a growing literature focusing on the economic consequences of health shocks in 
developed countries—in terms of income, consumption, wealth, labor market outcomes, and 
medical expenditures. This literature has found strong evidence that negative health shocks are 
associated with reductions in income and wealth. For example, Smith (1999) finds that onset of a 
serious health condition reduces wealth by an average of US$17,000.
1 Stephens (2001) finds that 
disability of the head of a household is associated with a long-term decline in consumption. One 
of the conduits through which health shocks impact on consumption is labor supply. Smith 
(1999) finds a reduction of about 4 hours per week and a 15 percentage point decline in the 
probability of remaining in the labor force from a severe health event.
2 Using the same data, 
Levy (2002) also finds a negative impact on labor force participation, but no reduction in hours 
once participation is controlled for. Large effects of health shocks on labor supply have also been 
found in German data (Riphahn 1999). Not surprisingly, health shocks have also been shown to 
have a large impact on medical expenditures  (Smith 1999; Wu 2001). 
Less is known about the economic consequences of health shocks in middle- and low-
income countries.
3 In general, research on risk and risk management in these contexts has 
demonstrated that households are able to use precautionary savings, informal networks, formal 
insurance, and other institutions to smooth consumption in the face of idiosyncratic shocks, 
although insurance tends to be far from perfect (Morduch 1995; Townsend 1995; Dercon 2002). 
In general, this research has focused on climactic and other idiosyncratic shocks, but there is also 
a limited literature on the specific issue of health shocks. For example, Gertler and Gruber 
(2002) provide evidence that households in Indonesia are unable to perfectly insure consumption 
                                                 
1 See also Levy (2002) and Wu (2001).  
2 For a review of the literature, see Currie and Madrian (1999). 
3 There is of course a sizeable literature on the general relationship between health and economic outcomes in developing 
countries (Behrman and Deolalikar 1988; Strauss and Thomas 1995; Strauss and Thomas 1998)   3
against health risks. Similarly Dercon and Krishnan (2000) show that in Ethiopia the 
consumption risks associated with health shocks are not borne equally by all household 
members, and Wagstaff (2005) finds evidence that health shocks are associated with a reduction 
in consumption in Vietnam, in particular for uninsured and better-off households. Health shocks 
have also been found to reduce labor supply in both Africa and Asia (Pitt and Rosenzweig 1986; 
Schultz and Tansel 1997), although the impact on productivity and wages is less clear. Gertler 
and Gruber (2002) find health shocks to reduce labor supply and income in Indonesia, although 
the effect is not significant for all health shock measures. They also find a significant effect on 
medical expenditures, although this effect is considerably smaller than the impact on income.  
Drawing on work from both developed and developing countries, this paper explores the 
economic consequences of health shocks in China. It focuses on how changes in self-assessed 
health of the head of household impact on income, household labor supply and medical 
expenditures. Although the lack of consumption data does not permit us to test the extent of 
consumption insurance, we extend previous work by examining whether formal health insurance 
mitigates the economic consequences of a health shock. This question has received some 
attention in the context of developed countries. For example, both Smith (1999; 2003) and Levy 
(2002) find that the impact of health shocks on income and wealth are not significantly different 
between the insured and uninsured in the US (Smith 1999; Levy 2002). However, they do find 
evidence that insurance reduces out-of-pocket payments. How do these issues play out in China? 
How are households affected by health shocks? Are there differences in the impact of health 
shocks between the rich and poor? Does health insurance protect households against risk? If so, 
does this protection operate only on the expenditure side or also on the income side? In a country 
that is currently considering or undertaking major health system reforms, these are important 
questions to ask and answer. 
   4
II. DATA, CONTEXT, AND METHODS  
Data and descriptive statistics 
The analysis is based on the China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS).
4 The CHNS is a 
longitudinal survey that covers nine out of China’s 33 province-level divisions.
5 Four counties, 
stratified by income, were randomly selected in each of the 9 provinces. In addition, the 
provincial capital and a lower income city were selected when feasible. Within the 36 counties 
and urban areas, 190 primary sampling units (villages and urban neighbourhoods) were selected 
randomly. The paper draws on data from four rounds of the CHNS: 1991, 1993, 1997, and 
2000.
6 In each year, we focus on the heads of households. The total number of observations for 
each year is 2,368 (1991), 2,627 (1993), 2,985 (1997), and 2,667 (2000).
7 
The four rounds of the CHNS panel cover a period of dramatic change in China. In this 
paper we focus on how changes in self-assessed health (SAH) relate to changes in economic 
outcomes. SAH—sometimes referred to as General Health Status—is based on self-evaluation of 
health status according to a scale of four or five, typically ranging from ‘poor’ to ‘excellent’. 
SAH is popular in the empirical literature because it has been shown to be highly correlated with 
subsequent morbidity and mortality.
8 In the parts of China covered by the CHNS, SAH has 
worsened gradually over the four rounds of survey (Table 1).
9 In 1991, 27% of heads of 
households rated their health as fair or poor; by 2000, this had increased to 37%. This worsening 
is also reflected in the principal health shocks variable used in the paper, SAH_CHANGE, which 
is simply the change in SAH between periods. Acknowledging the restrictions imposed by using 
a simple difference in SAH as a health shock measure, we also explore a more flexible form 
                                                 
4 Details taken from CHNS website http://www.cpc.unc.edu/projects/china. 
5 Guangxi, Guizhou, Heilongjiang (1997 and 2000 only), Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Jiangsu, Liaoning (not 1997), and Shandong. 
6 The first round of the CHNS was implemented in 1989. Data from this round are not used here because some of the variables of 
interest are not available in the first round, and because of the lack of comparability in other variables.  
7 In the CHNS sampling procedure, all new households formed from sample households who resided in sample areas were added 
to the sample. In 1997, new communities were added to replace households or communities no longer participating. Moreover, 
Heilongjiang province replaced Liaoning province. In 2000, newly formed households and replacement households were also 
added, and Liaoning province returned to the study. Although attrition has been relatively low, the sample size used for the 
analysis is considerably lower than the total number of households in the sample: 3,616 (1991), 3,441 (1993), 3,875 (1997), and 
4,403 (2002). This primarily reflects two factors. First, data were incomplete for some of the variables of interest, in particular 
self-assessed health. As a result, nearly 20% of observations were dropped. In addition, approximately 10% of the observations 
had to be dropped because data were only available for one year. A small number of observations were also dropped as outliers in 
the data. 
8 The use of self-assessed health to study the impact of health shocks also has important limitations. These are discussed in more 
detail in the method section. 
9 The question about self-reported status in the CHNS is asked relative to ‘other people in your age’. As a consequence, changes 
in SAH should not reflect secular, age-related, changes in health status.   5
based on four dummy variables (SAH_POS_CH_LGE, SAH_POS_CH_SML, 
SAH_NEG_CH_SML, SAH_NEG_CH_LGE) that distinguish between large (a jump of two or 
three SAH ratings) and small (a jump of one SAH rating).
10 These two sets of health shock 
variables permit us to test whether (i) the impact is a positive health shocks on outcomes is 
different from a negative health shock; and (ii) a ‘large’ health shock has an impact that is twice 
as large as a ‘small’ health shock. Over the four rounds of the survey, a sizeable and growing 
share of the sample experience negative health shocks. In 1993, 25% of household heads had 
experienced a worsening of health status relative to 1991. Only a small percentage of 
household—2% in 1991—experience what we refer to as a large shock. In 2000, the percentage 
of household heads that experience a negative shock increased to 32%, while 6% experienced a 
large negative shock. 
In terms of economic outcomes, we focus on income, labor market outcomes, and 
medical expenditures. The general income variable, PCINC, represents per capita household 
income at constant prices. As can be seen from Table 2, per capita income has increased steadily 
over the survey period, fuelled by growth in both earned (EARN_PCINC) and unearned 
(UNEARN_PCINC) income. For labor market outcomes, we construct two variables, capturing 
the total number of hours per week on average by the head of household (TOTHRS_HD) and by 
other household members (TOTHRS_NONHD). We also consider the labor market participation 
decision (TOTHRS_PARTIC), which captures whether total average hours per week last year 
was greater than zero. Finally, medical expenditures (OOP) include all health expenditures 
incurred in the last month, but excludes expenditures reimbursed by insurance. With the 
exception of unearned income and labor supply by non-head household members, there is a 
sizeable gradient in the relationship between SAH and the outcome variables considered (Table 
4).  
In addition to looking at how health shocks impact on economic outcomes in general, we 
also try to understand whether there are differences in impact between the poor and non-poor, 
and between the insured and uninsured. The poverty dummy (POOR) is a relative measure of 
poverty, which indicates whether household income was among the bottom 40% in the sample in 
                                                 
10 Changes of two and three SAH ratings were grouped because the number of observations with a change in three ratings was 
very small (<0.5%).   6
the previous year.
11 For health insurance, three dummy variables are constructed. This includes 
coverage by the Government Health Insurance scheme (GIS) for government employees, the 
Labor Health Insurance scheme (LIS) for employees in state-owned enterprises, insurance 
coverage by the work unit other than state-owned enterprises, the cooperative medical scheme 
(CMS) in rural areas, and other forms of health insurance. In general, health insurance coverage 
(HI) has declined over the survey period, from 31% of household heads in 1991 to 24% in 2000. 
This trend reflects changes in the financing and institutional arrangements for health insurance 
that started in the early 1980s and that are still ongoing (Liu 2002; Akin, Dow et al. 2004; Liu 
2004). The decline in insurance coverage is more marked in the case of urban schemes 
(URB_HI) than in rural areas, where there has even been a small increase in coverage over the 
survey period. 
Methods 
For all the outcomes of interest, the equation of interest is the following equation:
12 
(1)  it i it it it u h X y + + Δ + = α γ β ln , 
where  yit  is the outcome variable (income, labor supply of head, labor supply of non-head 
household members, and medical expenditures), Xit is a vector of time-variant individual and 
household characteristics respectively, Δhit is the health shock variable, αi are individual effects 
capturing both time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity and a vector of time-invariant individual 
and household characteristics, and uit is an error term that may include time-variant individual 
effects.  
The challenge in consistently estimating γ arises from three factors. First, there is 
potential measurement error in the health shock variable (Strauss and Thomas 1998). Perceptions 
about own health status are likely to be influenced by education, contact with the health systems, 
and other factors, rendering measurement error in SAH correlated with independent variables of 
interest. This is in contrast with some more ‘objective’ measures of health shocks that have been 
used in the literature, including the emergence of a new serious health condition between waves 
in panel data (Smith 1999; Wu 2001; Levy 2002), the onset of impairment and disability 
                                                 
11 We use lagged poverty because current poverty status may be a consequence of a health shock, and is hence endogenous.  
12 This approach is similar to that followed by Smith (1999) and Levy (2002). In contrast, Gertler and Gruber (2002) focus on the 
change in the log outcome. We explored this specification. As discussed further in the results section, the results were similar 
between the two specifications.    7
(Haveman and Wolfe 1990; Baldwin, Zeager et al. 1994; Stephens 2001), change in activities of 
daily living (Gertler and Gruber 2002), change in illness status (Kochar 1995; Townsend 1995; 
Schultz and Tansel 1997; Riphahn 1999), changes in BMI (Wagstaff 2005), and ‘unpredicted’ 
number of days unable to work (Dercon and Krishnan 2000). In this paper, measurement error 
problems are mitigated by the fact that we focus on change  in SAH. Time-invariant 
measurement errors in SAH have hence been eliminated through the construction of the variable. 
Any remaining measurement error in SAH_CHANGE will tend to bias the coefficient 
downwards. 
Second, the presence of unobserved individual heterogeneity—e.g. preferences or health 
endowments—may be a determinant of both health and the outcome of interest. This would 
render OLS estimates biased. We overcome this problem by  exploiting the panel dimension of 
the data to estimate a fixed-effect model. In effect, this entails the inclusion of an individual level 
dummy which capture both time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity and time-invariant 
explanatory variables. We assume that there is no time-invariant heterogeneity that is correlated 
with the health shock variables. 
A final estimation problem arises if health is simultaneously determined with labor 
supply, productivity, income, and health inputs. In this framework  (Grossman 1972), flows or 
changes in health over time reflect investment in health, depreciation of health stock, as well as 
unexpected shocks. As a result, innovations in the outcome equation feed back to health through 
the impact of the outcome, say higher income or labor supply, on health investments. The result 
is a correlation between the error term, uit and Δhit. The simultaneity problem may be particularly 
severe with SAH, which, to a greater extent than more objective measures like activity 
limitations or onset of specific conditions, includes psychological dimensions.
13 These problems 
have led attempts to instrument for SAH in empirical analysis of the relationship between health 
and economic outcomes, but it has often proven difficult to find convincing instruments and 
exclusion restrictions.
14 Our strategy for dealing with the potential simultaneity of health shocks 
                                                 
13 Although feed-back mechanisms may be stronger, the general nature of SAH as a measure of health status is also one of its 
strengths. The use of more specific health measures based on physical functionings or particular diagnoses as proxies for general 
health status can be problematic because their relationship with economic outcomes may be weak. Moreover, the impact of 
‘objective’ measures of health limitations on economic outcomes may vary with sex, occupation, and other factors (Baldwin, 
Zeager et al. 1994), creating problems that are similar to the measurement error issues that arise with SAH. For a general 
discussion, see Currie and Madrian (1999). 
14 For example, Disney, Emmerson, et al. (2003) use activity limitations and individual characteristics, following an approach 
proposed by Bound (1999). Contoyannis and Rice (2001) use different instrumental variable estimators to study the impact of   8
is to consider a specification where ‘large’ health shocks—which are more likely to represent 
exogenous shocks—enter as separate dummy variables from ‘small’ shocks. This is admittedly 
an imperfect identification strategy. However, as pointed out by Bound (1991), the bias arising 
from the endogeneity of SAH will at least tend to be offset by any downward bias related to 
measurement errors in SAH. 
In addition to the basic model (1), we also estimate models where the health shock 
variable(s) is interacted with an insurance or poverty dummy, i.e.  
 (2)  it i it i it it it u h I h X y + + Δ + Δ + = α φ γ β ln . 
This permits us to test whether the economic consequences of health shocks are different for the 
insured and uninsured, and for the poor and non-poor.  
 
III. RESULTS  
Specification 
Results are reported in Table 5 - Table 13. Columns (A) and (B) presents the results for 
two different specifications, as well as tests of the hypotheses that (i) the impact of a negative 
health shock is different from a positive health shock, and (ii) that the coefficients on ‘large’ 
shocks are twice those of ‘small’ shocks. For all the outcome variables, we cannot reject the 
hypothesis that the absolute value of the coefficient on a negative health change is the same as 
the coefficient on positive health change. Similarly, including change in SAH as dummy 
variables for large and small changes, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the coefficients on 
large changes (positive or negative) are twice those of small changes for any of the outcomes.
15 
It hence seems that there is little reason to use the more flexible specification, and for the 
purpose of looking at poverty and insurance interaction, we restrict attention to the simple health 
change variable (columns (C) to (E)). 
                                                                                                                                                             
health on wages, but find limited impact on the estimated coefficients on health. Other studies have used prices of health inputs 
(e.g. travel time to health care provider) or community level characteristics. The effectiveness of this approach is often limited by 
a lack of variation or low correlation between instruments and health status. 
15 The same conclusions holds if we focus on change in log outcome, with the exception of out-of-pocket medical expenditures, 
where the impact of a positive health shock is significantly higher than that of a negative health shock.   9
Health shocks and income 
Health shocks are associated with significant changes in income (Table 5). The 
coefficient on SAH_CHANGE suggests that a worsening of SAH by one rating reduces income 
by 6.2%, and a worsening by two ratings by 12.4%. The poverty interaction is not significant. 
There is however weak evidence that the insured individuals, in particular the urban insured, are 
protected against income shocks, but the effect is not significant. Although the Government and 
Labor Insurance Schemes do not include any direct sickness benefits, this finding is plausible as 
many of the government and SOE employees who are covered by these schemes tend to enjoy 
limited sickness insurance as a separate benefit. 
We also look separately at earned and unearned income. As expected, the overall effect 
of health shocks on income is operating primarily through earned income (Table 6). As is the 
case with total income, poverty and insurance interactions are not significant. In the case of 
unearned  income, health shocks do not have an overall effect. The poverty interaction is 
however significant and positive, such that the total effect of health shocks on unearned income 
is positive for the poor.
16 We also explored whether health shocks had any impact on specific 
components of unearned income. We do not find any significant effects for the sample as a 
whole. However, when we include the poverty interaction, we find a positive and significant 
effect on in-kind transfers from family and friends (Table 10).
17 This suggests that the poor 
benefit from some protection against income shocks associated with adverse health events. 
However, transfers from family and friends comprise only a small share of income (9.4% of total 
unearned income), and the impact of health shocks on overall income remains negative (Table 
11). 
Health shocks and labor supply 
It is reasonable to expect that the negative impact of a health shock on per capita income 
is at least in part related to a reduction in labor supply. The analysis bears this out, considering 
both total hours worked (Table 8), where the results suggest a reduction in hours of 5% for a 
                                                 
16 The same conclusions hold when we focus on change in earned and unearned income.  
17 We also find a positive interaction dummy for another two components of unearned income (poverty and welfare funds, and 
other sources), but the combined effect (coefficient on SAH_CHANGE plus the interaction dummy) is not significant in both 
cases.   10
worsening of one SAH rating, and the participation decision (Table 9).
18 The interaction effects 
with poverty and health insurance status are positive, but not significant. We also explore 
whether there is any evidence that other household members compensate by increasing their 
labor supply in the face of an adverse health shock, but find no evidence that this is the case.
19  
Health shocks and out-of-pocket expenditure 
Finally, we find, strong evidence that health shocks are associated with changes in out-of-
pocket medical expenditures (Table 12), suggesting that a change in SAH of one rating results in 
a change in medical expenditures of 9% on average. We find a negative and significant 
coefficient on the poverty interaction. This indicates that health shocks have a smaller, but still 
significant, impact on medical expenditures for the poor. Of course, the flipside of this finding is 
that the poor are likely to obtain less health care when they experience a health shock, with 
potentially adverse consequences for health. In contrast, the health insurance interaction is 




Health shocks are ubiquitous events in both developed and developing countries. 
Although there is a sizeable literature on the economic consequences of health shocks in 
developed countries, the evidence is scarce for developing and middle-income countries. Even 
less is known about whether shocks impact differently on different types of households—e.g. 
depending on insurance status or level of income.  
This paper has provided new evidence on the economic consequences of health shocks in 
China. The results indicate that negative health shocks—defined as a worsening of self-assessed 
health—have a significant and sometimes large impact on income, labor supply, and medical 
                                                 
18 We undertook the same analysis looking at hours worked in primary occupation rather than total hours. The results are 
consistent, and findings from the regressions of primary occupation hours are not reported here. 
19 Results are not reported, but are available from the authors upon request. 
20 When we focus on change in log medical expenditures, the urban health insurance interaction is positive and significant (Table 
13). This indicates that the rate of change in medical expenditure is not only higher when an individual experiences a negative 
health shock, but that the rate of change is significantly higher for the urban insured. Keeping in mind that the medical 
expenditure variable refers to out-of-pocket expenditures rather than total medical expenditures (i.e. expenditures covered by 
insurance are excluded), this finding is somewhat surprising. It suggests that having health insurance (at least urban insurance) 
increases rather than reduces out-of-pocket, presumably because the insured use both more and more sophisticated health 
services than the insured.   11
expenditures. There are indications that the impact on income is less important for the insured, 
but the effect is not significant. We also find evidence that negative health shocks are associated 
with an increase in unearned income for the poor but not the non-poor. This effect, which seems 
to be due to in-kind transfers from friends and family rather than formal safety net schemes, is 
however not strong enough to offset the impact on overall income. The loss in income is a 
consequence of a reduction in labor supply for the head of household, and we do not find 
evidence that other household members compensate by increasing their labor supply. Finally, as 
expected, negative health shocks are associated with a significant increase in out-of-pocket 
health care expenditures. This increase is smaller for the poor. More surprisingly, there is also 
some evidence that it is greater for the insured than the uninsured.  
These findings provide new evidence on health shocks and their economic consequences, 
but are also of relevance to current policy issues in China and elsewhere. First, the paper also 
makes it clear that health insurance does not necessarily reduce expected out-of-pocket health 
care expenditures. Indeed, the results suggest that the opposite may be true. This undoubtedly 
reflects the fact that the insured receive more and better health care. What is surprising is that 
this increase in the quantity and quality of care is so great that it more than offsets the lower cost 
of care for the insured. The findings beg the question of whether health insurance at least 
provides protection against very high (catastrophic) health expenditures. In a context of heavy 
reliance on fee-for-service payment of providers, strong financial incentives for individual 
providers, and weak mechanisms of quality control, the findings also raise concern about 
whether some of the increase in spending associated with health shocks reflects the provision of 
unnecessary care. 
Second, the results suggest that a large negative health shock reduces income by 12.4% 
and increases medical expenditures by 17.6% on average. Both these effects serve to reduce 
disposable income. However, considering that medical expenditures are only a small share of 
income, the effect on income is considerably more important. Hence, while health insurance and 
safety net schemes that assist with health care expenditures have an important role to play in 
protecting households against catastrophic health expenditures, households remain vulnerable in 
the absence of some form of sickness insurance. This suggests that the current health reform 
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Table 1: Health shock variables 
1991 1993 1997 2000  All  years 
VARIABLE Description 
Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean  sd  Min.  Max. 
SAH=1 (EXCELLENT)  0.128  0.120  0.137 0.133 0.130 0.336  0.000 1.000 
SAH=2  (GOOD)  0.602 0.606 0.592 0.505 0.576 0.494  0.000 1.000 
SAH=3  (FAIR)  0.237 0.234 0.230 0.307 0.252 0.434  0.000 1.000 
SAH=4 (POOR) 
Self-assessed health (SAH) reported by 
head of household 
0.033 0.040 0.041 0.055 0.042 0.201  0.000 1.000 
SAH_CHANGE Difference  between SAH in current period 
and SAH in last period. A positive value 
corresponds to a worsening of health status 
    0.002 0.030 0.133 0.060 0.875 -3.000 3.000 
SAH_POS_CH_LGE Dummy  variable for whether head of 
household has experienced an improvement 
of more than one rating in SAH 
  0.029 0.038 0.029 0.032 0.175  0.000 1.000 
SAH_POS_CH_SML  Dummy variable for whether head of 
household has experienced an improvement 
of one rating in SAH 
  0.220 0.206 0.191 0.205 0.404  0.000 1.000 
SAH_NEG_CH_SML Dummy  variable for whether head of 
household has experienced a worsening of 
one rating in SAH 
  0.229 0.226 0.261 0.240 0.427  0.000 1.000 
SAH_NEG_CH_LGE Dummy  variable for whether head of 
household has experienced a worsening of 
more than one rating in SAH 
    0.025 0.043 0.060 0.044 0.204  0.000 1.000 
n = 2,719 (1991), 2,715 (1993), 3,089 (1997), 2,798 (2000)           
Note: No data available for 1991 for the variables that are constructed using lagged SAH         
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Table 2: Dependent variables 
1991 1993 1997 2000  All  years  VARIABLE 
Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean  sd  Min.  Max. 
Description 
PCINC  1,154.30 1,353.86 1,432.97 1,880.03 1,457.23 1,889.63 0.00 69,259.55 
natural log  6.54 6.53 6.62 6.74 6.61 1.67 0.00 11.15 
Δ natural log  - -0.01  0.01  0.03  0.01  0.72  -4.36  4.77 
Total household income from all sources divided by number 
of household members (1989 prices) 
EARN_PCINC  1,034.17 1,166.00 1,212.45 1,553.79 1,249.88  1,840.37 0.00 68,413.88 
natural log  6.31 6.16 6.01 6.07 6.13 2.18 0.00 11.13 
Δ natural log  -  -0.10 -0.07 -0.01 -0.05  0.84  -4.30  4.54 
Total income from salaries, business income, agriculture, 
fishing, and handicrafts, asset rentals, and other minor items, 
divided by number of householdm embers (1989 prices) 
UNEARN_PCINC  157.18 187.86 220.53 326.24 225.81 575.75  0.00 10,120.39 
natural log  2.30 2.39 2.64 2.57 2.49 2.79 0.00 9.22 
Δ natural log  -  0.04 0.08 0.02 0.05  1.08 -3.95  3.97 
Total income from pensions, welfare payments, transfers 
from friends and family, gifts from the workplace, and other 
sources (1989 prices) 
TOTHRS_HD  38.05 31.27 28.51 24.20 30.40 24.70  0.00  138.00 
natural log  3.16 2.78 2.68 2.35 2.74 1.56 0.00 4.93 
Δ natural log  -  -0.36 -0.24 -0.41 -0.34  1.66  -6.40  6.56 
Average number of hours worked by head of household per 
week during last year, including primary and secondary 
employment and home production 
TOTHRS_PARTIC 62.87 50.98 45.68 38.55 49.32  48.93  0.00  476.00  Dummy variable for whether the head of household is 
working (TOTHRS_HD > 0) 
TOTHRS_NONHD  3.59 3.22 3.06 2.67 3.13  1.65 0.00  6.17 
natural log  -  -0.38 -0.25 -0.41 -0.35  1.73  -6.73  6.07 
Δ natural log  0.87 0.80 0.79 0.72 0.79 0.41 0.00 1.00 
Total hours worked by non-head household members per 
week on average during the last year 
OOP    5.65 5.59 9.53 7.40 7.12 85.65  0.00  2,774.77 
natural log  0.19 0.11 0.18 0.19 0.17 0.82 0.00 7.93 
Δ natural log  - -0.04  0.01  0.01  -0.01  0.38  -3.76  3.71 
Total health care expenditures during last month, net of any 
reimbursement from health insurance (1989 prices) 
n = 2,719 (1991), 2,715 (1993), 3,089 (1997), 2,798 (2000)        
Note: 365 observations dropped for earned and unearned income        
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Table 3: Independent variables 
1991 1993 1997 2000  All  years 
VARIABLE Description 
Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean  sd  Min.  Max. 
              
AGE01  Average age of household members on Jan. 
1, 2001 
58.5 58.1 55.0 53.2 56.1 14.8  25.0  100.0 
AGE01_SQ  Average age squared  3,653.2  3,593.7 3,237.3 3,019.2 3,369.5 1,764.6  625.0  10,000.0 
AGE01_CUB  Average age cubed  242,348.6  235,770.7  202,769.9 181,611.1 215,026.4 167,564.1 15,625.0 1,000,000.0 
HHSIZE  Number of household members  2.97 4.04 3.78 3.61 3.61 1.44  1.00  12.00 
HHSIZE_SQ  Number of household members squared  10.41 18.46 16.23 15.07 15.09 12.18 1.00  144.00 
HHSIZE_CUB  Number of household members cubed  42.43 93.73 77.56 70.88 71.42 93.19 1.00  1,728.00 
              
POOR  Per capita household income is among 
bottom 40% of sample in last period 
-  0.40 0.44 0.39 0.41 0.49  0.00  1.00 
HI  Head of household is covered by either 
urban or rural health insurance 
0.31 0.28 0.27 0.24 0.28 0.45  0.00  1.00 
URB_HI  Head of household is covered by 'public 
insurance' or 'workers insurance', or by 
other type of insurance and resident in 
urban area 
0.26 0.25 0.18 0.17 0.21 0.41  0.00  1.00 
RUR_HI  Head of household is covered by 
'cooperative medical insurance' or 'work 
unit insurance', or by other type of 
insurance and resident in rural area. 
0.05 0.04 0.10 0.07 0.06 0.25  0.00  1.00 
n = 2,719 (1991), 2,715 (1993), 3,089 (1997), 2,798 (2000)              17
Table 4: SAH and economic outcomes 







NONHD  OOP  
1991            
Excellent 1,231.80  1,096.97 104.79  40.54  55.05  2.11 
Good 1,195.81  1,070.29  163.90 39.21  63.60  1.18 
Fair 1,045.31  940.60  172.25 35.70  64.13  4.16 
Poor 879.47  758.60  149.02  24.04 70.81  111.50 
1993            
Excellent 1,533.70  1,375.07 158.62  33.90  46.13  0.27 
Good 1,349.62  1,182.45  167.17 33.10  51.36  1.59 
Fair 1,343.04  1,102.14  240.91 27.11  51.95  9.34 
Poor 947.17  669.00  278.17  20.02 53.83 59.69 
1997            
Excellent 1,697.79  1,562.29 135.50  30.85  41.15  0.34 
Good 1,430.50  1,232.77  197.72 30.04  47.19  1.89 
Fair 1,338.99  1,036.18  302.81 25.11  45.89 14.55 
Poor 1,110.94  739.09  371.85 17.70  37.61 123.00 
2000            
Excellent 1,834.89  1,628.66 206.22  30.42  41.54  0.29 
Good 1,984.00  1,713.84  270.16 25.64  39.35  2.79 
Fair 1,716.46  1,281.93  434.52 20.78  36.65 12.47 
Poor 1,946.70  1,418.51  528.19 14.88  34.65 38.73 
n = 2,719 (1991), 2,715 (1993), 3,089 (1997), 2,798 (2000) 
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Table 5: Results for log per capita total income 
log per capita income  VARIABLE 
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) 
SAH_CHANGE  -0.062    -0.071 -0.085 -0.085 
  -2.450    -1.980 -2.860 -2.860 
SAH_POS_CH_LGE    -0.029     
    -0.180     
SAH_POS_CH_SML    0.051     
    0.760     
SAH_NEG_CH_SML    -0.096     
    -1.520     
SAH_NEG_CH_LGE    -0.191     
    -1.430     
POOR X SAH_CHANGE      0.019     
     0.330    
HI X SAH_CHANGE        0.096   
      1.480   
URB_HI  X  SAH_CHANGE       0.101 
       1.340 
RUR_HI  X  SAH_CHANGE       0.084 
               0.810 
       
LINEAR COMBINATIONS       
SAH_NEGCHANGE - SAH_POSCHANGE   -0.072      
  -0.816      
SAH_POS_LGE - 2 * SAH_NEG_SML     -0.131     
    -0.694     
SAH_NEG_LGE - 2 * SAH_NEG_SML     0.002     
    0.009     
SAH_CHANGE + POOR X SAH_CHANGE     -0.052    
     -1.297    
SAH_CHANGE + HI X SAH_CHANGE      0.011   
      0.195   
SAH_CHANGE + URB_HI X SAH_CHANGE       0.017 
       0.245 
SAH_CHANGE + RUR_HI X SAH_CHANGE       -0.001 
               -0.009 
       
N  7,486 7,486 7,486 7,486 7,486 
Note: Results estimated with household-level fixed effects. Coefficients on controls (household mean age 
(level, squared, cubed), household size (level, squared, cubed), and wave dummies are not reported. t-
statistics are reported under each coefficient. Coefficients in bold are significant at the 10% level (two-
sided). The test for symmetry between positive and negative shocks is based on a regression where 
positive (SAH_POSCHANGE) and negative (SAH_NEGCHANGE) health change are included as 
separate variables, ranging from one to three. Results are not reported 
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Table 6: Results for log per capita earned income 
log per capita earned income  VARIABLE 
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) 
SAH_CHANGE  -0.100    -0.084 -0.107 -0.107 
  -3.190    -1.910 -2.950 -2.950 
SAH_POS_CH_LGE    -0.147     
    -0.770     
SAH_POS_CH_SML    0.059     
    0.710     
SAH_NEG_CH_SML    -0.137     
    -1.760     
SAH_NEG_CH_LGE    -0.482     
    -2.950     
POOR X SAH_CHANGE      -0.036     
     -0.520    
HI X SAH_CHANGE        0.033   
      0.410   
URB_HI  X  SAH_CHANGE       0.031 
       0.340 
RUR_HI  X  SAH_CHANGE       0.036 
               0.280 
       
LINEAR COMBINATIONS       
SAH_NEGCHANGE - SAH_POSCHANGE   -0.175      
  -1.607      
SAH_POS_LGE - 2 * SAH_NEG_SML     -0.265     
    -1.137     
SAH_NEG_LGE - 2 * SAH_NEG_SML     -0.207     
    -1.011     
SAH_CHANGE + POOR X SAH_CHANGE     -0.119    
     -2.418    
SAH_CHANGE + HI X SAH_CHANGE      -0.075   
      -1.089   
SAH_CHANGE + URB_HI X SAH_CHANGE       -0.076 
       -0.905 
SAH_CHANGE + RUR_HI X SAH_CHANGE       -0.072 
               -0.600 
       
N  7,486 7,486 7,486 7,486 7,486 
Note: Results estimated with household-level fixed effects. Coefficients on controls (household mean age 
(level, squared, cubed), household size (level, squared, cubed), and wave dummies are not reported. t-
statistics are reported under each coefficient. Coefficients in bold are significant at the 10% level (two-
sided). The test for symmetry between positive and negative shocks is based on a regression where 
positive (SAH_POSCHANGE) and negative (SAH_NEGCHANGE) health change are included as 
separate variables, ranging from one to three. Results are not reported 
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Table 7: Results for log per capita unearned income 
log per capita unearned income  VARIABLE 
(A) (B)  (C)  (D)  (E) 
SAH_CHANGE 0.031    -0.031  0.037  0.036 
 0.850    -0.610  0.880  0.860 
SAH_POS_CH_LGE    0.102     
    0.460     
SAH_POS_CH_SML    0.002     
    0.020     
SAH_NEG_CH_SML    0.001     
    0.010     
SAH_NEG_CH_LGE   0.341     
   1.800     
POOR X SAH_CHANGE      0.139    
     1.740    
HI X SAH_CHANGE        -0.027   
      -0.290   
URB_HI X SAH_CHANGE          -0.072 
        -0.670 
RUR_HI X SAH_CHANGE          0.067 
               0.450 
         
LINEAR COMBINATIONS         
SAH_NEGCHANGE - SAH_POSCHANGE   0.108       
  0.856       
SAH_POS_LGE - 2 * SAH_NEG_SML     0.097     
    0.361     
SAH_NEG_LGE - 2 * SAH_NEG_SML     0.339     
    1.428     
SAH_CHANGE + POOR X SAH_CHANGE     0.108    
     1.891    
SAH_CHANGE + HI X SAH_CHANGE      0.010   
      0.131   
SAH_CHANGE + URB_HI X SAH_CHANGE        -0.036 
        -0.366 
SAH_CHANGE + RUR_HI X SAH_CHANGE        0.103 
               0.745 
         
N  7,486  7,486 7,486 7,486 7,486 
Note: Results estimated with household-level fixed effects. Coefficients on controls (household mean age 
(level, squared, cubed), household size (level, squared, cubed), and wave dummies are not reported. t-
statistics are reported under each coefficient. Coefficients in bold are significant at the 10% level (two-
sided). The test for symmetry between positive and negative shocks is based on a regression where 
positive (SAH_POSCHANGE) and negative (SAH_NEGCHANGE) health change are included as 
separate variables, ranging from one to three. Results are not reported 
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Table 8: Results for log total hours worked by head of household 
log total hours worked by household head  VARIABLE 
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) 
SAH_CHANGE  -0.056    -0.075 -0.065 -0.064 
  -2.790    -2.640 -2.760 -2.750 
SAH_POS_CH_LGE    -0.015     
    -0.130     
SAH_POS_CH_SML    0.015     
    0.280     
SAH_NEG_CH_SML   -0.100     
   -2.000     
SAH_NEG_CH_LGE    -0.196     
    -1.860     
POOR X SAH_CHANGE      0.041     
     0.930    
HI X SAH_CHANGE        0.037   
      0.720   
URB_HI  X  SAH_CHANGE       0.058 
       0.980 
RUR_HI  X  SAH_CHANGE       -0.009 
               -0.110 
       
LINEAR COMBINATIONS       
SAH_NEGCHANGE - SAH_POSCHANGE   -0.096      
  -1.364      
SAH_POS_LGE - 2 * SAH_NEG_SML     -0.045     
    -0.303     
SAH_NEG_LGE - 2 * SAH_NEG_SML     0.005     
    0.038     
SAH_CHANGE + POOR X SAH_CHANGE     -0.033    
     -1.049    
SAH_CHANGE + HI X SAH_CHANGE      -0.028   
      -0.638   
SAH_CHANGE + URB_HI X SAH_CHANGE       -0.006 
       -0.110 
SAH_CHANGE + RUR_HI X SAH_CHANGE       -0.073 
               -0.949 
       
N  7,486 7,486 7,486 7,486 7,486 
Note: Results estimated with household-level fixed effects. Coefficients on controls (household mean age 
(level, squared, cubed), household size (level, squared, cubed), and wave dummies are not reported. t-
statistics are reported under each coefficient. Coefficients in bold are significant at the 10% level (two-
sided). The test for symmetry between positive and negative shocks is based on a regression where 
positive (SAH_POSCHANGE) and negative (SAH_NEGCHANGE) health change are included as 
separate variables, ranging from one to three. Results are not reported 
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Table 9: Results for logit of labor market participation 
labor market participation by head (total hours > 0)  VARIABLE 
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) 
SAH_CHANGE  -0.150    -0.210 -0.190 -0.190 
  -2.710    -2.610 -3.000 -3.000 
SAH_POS_CH_LGE    -0.189     
    -0.600     
SAH_POS_CH_SML    0.059     
    0.430     
SAH_NEG_CH_SML    -0.317     
   -2.360     
SAH_NEG_CH_LGE   -0.464     
    -1.570     
POOR X SAH_CHANGE      0.122     
     1.030    
HI X SAH_CHANGE        0.196   
      1.320   
URB_HI  X  SAH_CHANGE       0.231 
       1.290 
RUR_HI  X  SAH_CHANGE       0.137 
               0.600 
       
LINEAR COMBINATIONS       
SAH_NEGCHANGE - SAH_POSCHANGE   -0.299      
  -1.624      
SAH_POS_LGE - 2 * SAH_NEG_SML     -0.308     
    -0.786     
SAH_NEG_LGE - 2 * SAH_NEG_SML     0.170     
    0.466     
SAH_CHANGE + POOR X SAH_CHANGE     -0.087    
     -1.067    
SAH_CHANGE + HI X SAH_CHANGE      0.006   
      0.046   
SAH_CHANGE + URB_HI X SAH_CHANGE       0.040 
       0.246 
SAH_CHANGE + RUR_HI X SAH_CHANGE       -0.054 
               -0.247 
       
N  1,726 1,726 1,726 1,726 1,726 
Note: Results estimated with household-level fixed effects logit. Coefficients on controls (household 
mean age (level, squared, cubed), household size (level, squared, cubed), and wave dummies are not 
reported. t-statistics are reported under each coefficient. Coefficients in bold are significant at the 10% 
level (two-sided). The test for symmetry between positive and negative shocks is based on a regression 
where positive (SAH_POSCHANGE) and negative (SAH_NEGCHANGE) health change are included as 
separate variables, ranging from one to three. Results are not reported 
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SAH_CHANGE 0.031  0.010  0.039  -0.023  0.006 -0.076 -0.037 -0.020 
 1.230  1.140  1.260  -1.760  0.190 -2.240 -1.080 -1.350 
POOR X SAH_CHANGE  -0.022  -0.014  -0.030  0.037  0.027  0.117 0.107 0.026 
 -0.550  -1.050  -0.630  1.760  0.550  2.170 1.970 1.100 
          
LINEAR COMBINATIONS  0.009  -0.004 0.008 0.013 0.032 0.040 0.070  0.006 
SAH_CHANGE + POOR X SAH_CHANGE  0.316  -0.449 0.239 0.895 0.933 1.048 1.787  0.338 
          
N  7,486 7,486 7,486 7,486 7,486 7,486 7,486 7,486 
Note: Results estimated with household-level fixed effects. Coefficients on controls (household mean age (level, squared, cubed), household size (level, squared, cubed), 
and wave dummies are not reported. t-statistics are reported under each coefficient. Coefficients in bold are significant at the 10% level (two-sided). 
 
  
Table 11: Components of unearned income 

























1991 157.2  9.84%  0.41%  42.19%  1.42% 6.11%  27.20%  9.80% 3.02% 
1993 187.9  8.73%  0.47%  44.04%  0.74% 6.32%  28.15%  9.40% 2.16% 
1997  220.5 15.83% 1.03% 43.56% 2.13% 9.76%  16.92%  10.15%  0.62% 
2000  326.2 17.94% 0.56% 56.09% 2.36% 13.24% 0.00%  8.78%  1.03% 
Total  225.8  14.24% 0.65% 48.07% 1.82% 9.78%  14.55%  9.44% 1.45% 
n = 2,719 (1991), 2,715 (1993), 3,089 (1997), 2,798 (2000) 
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Table 12: Results for log out-of-pocket medical expenditures 
log out-of-pocket medical expenditures  VARIABLE 
(A) (B) (C)  (D)  (E) 
SAH_CHANGE  0.088   0.114  0.084  0.084 
  7.020   6.480  5.760  5.780 
SAH_POS_CH_LGE   -0.182      
   -2.400      
SAH_POS_CH_SML   -0.082      
   -2.460      
SAH_NEG_CH_SML   0.068      
   2.190      
SAH_NEG_CH_LGE   0.240      
   3.670      
POOR X SAH_CHANGE      -0.058    
     -2.100    
HI X SAH_CHANGE        0.017   
       0.540   
URB_HI X SAH_CHANGE          0.041 
       1.110 
RUR_HI X SAH_CHANGE          -0.032 
               -0.630 
        
LINEAR COMBINATIONS        
SAH_NEGCHANGE - SAH_POSCHANGE   -0.008        
  -0.179        
SAH_POS_LGE - 2 * SAH_NEG_SML    -0.018       
   -0.198       
SAH_NEG_LGE - 2 * SAH_NEG_SML    0.103       
   1.261       
SAH_CHANGE + POOR X SAH_CHANGE     0.056    
     2.833    
SAH_CHANGE + HI X SAH_CHANGE     0.101   
     3.691   
SAH_CHANGE + URB_HI X SAH_CHANGE       0.125 
       3.735 
SAH_CHANGE + RUR_HI X SAH_CHANGE       0.052 
               1.092 
        
N  7,486 7,486 7,486  7,486 7,486 
Note: Results estimated with household-level fixed effects. Coefficients on controls (household mean age 
(level, squared, cubed), household size (level, squared, cubed), and wave dummies are not reported. t-
statistics are reported under each coefficient. Coefficients in bold are significant at the 10% level (two-
sided). The test for symmetry between positive and negative shocks is based on a regression where 
positive (SAH_POSCHANGE) and negative (SAH_NEGCHANGE) health change are included as 
separate variables, ranging from one to three. Results are not reported 
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Table 13: Results for change in log out-of-pocket medical expenditures 
Δ log out-of-pocket medical expenditures  VARIABLE 
(A) (B) (C)  (D)  (E) 
SAH_CHANGE  0.060   0.074  0.056  0.056 
  8.780   7.740  7.060  7.140 
SAH_POS_CH_LGE   -0.216      
   -5.240      
SAH_POS_CH_SML   -0.066      
   -3.630      
SAH_NEG_CH_SML   0.038      
   2.260      
SAH_NEG_CH_LGE   0.087      
   2.460      
POOR X SAH_CHANGE      -0.032    
     -2.110    
HI X SAH_CHANGE        0.016   
       0.930   
URB_HI X SAH_CHANGE          0.046 
       2.280 
RUR_HI X SAH_CHANGE          -0.046 
               -1.660 
        
LINEAR COMBINATIONS        
SAH_NEGCHANGE - SAH_POSCHANGE   -0.052       
  -2.209       
SAH_POS_LGE - 2 * SAH_NEG_SML    -0.085       
   -1.675       
SAH_NEG_LGE - 2 * SAH_NEG_SML    0.011       
   0.244       
SAH_CHANGE + POOR X SAH_CHANGE     0.042    
     3.931    
SAH_CHANGE + HI X SAH_CHANGE     0.072   
     4.835   
SAH_CHANGE + URB_HI X SAH_CHANGE       0.102 
       5.614 
SAH_CHANGE + RUR_HI X SAH_CHANGE       0.011 
               0.415 
        
N  7,486 7,486 7,486  7,486 7,486 
Note: Results estimated with household-level fixed effects. Coefficients on controls (household mean age 
(level, squared, cubed), household size (level, squared, cubed), and wave dummies are not reported. t-
statistics are reported under each coefficient. Coefficients in bold are significant at the 10% level (two-
sided). The test for symmetry between positive and negative shocks is based on a regression where 
positive (SAH_POSCHANGE) and negative (SAH_NEGCHANGE) health change are included as 
separate variables, ranging from one to three. Results are not reported 
 
 
  